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TESTING CORRECTIONAL DECISIONS
DANIEL GLASER
The author of the following article is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Illinois. From 1946 to 1949 he was Prisons Officer with the U.S. Military
Government in Germany. He was employed as Sociologist-Actuary from 1950-1954 by
the Illinois Parole and Pardon Board at the Pontiac and Joliet Branches of the Illinois
State Penitentiary. He has at various times been Research Assistant at the University
of Chicago and he is author of several articles in journals of Sociology.-EDrroR.
Decisions on the handling of criminals almost always involve predictions of future
behavior. Expectations as to an offender's probable response to different types of
treatment usually are an important influence in fixing length of sentence, determining
type of custody, designating assignments and activities during confinement, and
approving release from custody and a post-release program. These expectations may
not be the only considerations involved, nor even the most important factors. Notions
of "just punishment," legal limits, deference to public and private pressure, allowance
for availability of facilities, and also compassion and pity, likewise influence judicial
and correctional decisions at many levels. Nevertheless, the typical correctional
official, at almost every level and type of correctional activity, must make predictions
as to the probable future behavior of his charges. He does this repeatedly, on a routine
basis, during every working day. He may not state his predictive judgments explicitly,
but they are implicit in his thinking in connection with the many decisions on handling
offenders which he is called upon to make.
Most such predictions, whether formulated as predictions or merely implied in
recommendations for treatment, are arrived at on the basis of case study methods.
The official obtains all the separate facts and impressions which he finds it convenient to collect on an individual, and he synthesizes these into his own overall
impression. The official at a correctional institution concludes on this basis that the
subject of his consideration is a fair risk for parole recommendation, or is a safe risk
for the Honor Farm, or should be kept in Segregation for a while, or would benefit
from assignment to Vocational School, or would get along better in "A" House than
in "B" House. The parole or probation official predicts his client's behavior in
connection with decisions as to whether a given home or job is suitable for a particular individual, or in deciding whether to check up on the client weekly or every
other week.
Are these case study predictions arrived at by the officials through a mental
process basically different from the process which the statistician employs in arriving
at actuarial predictions for individuals? We submit, firstly, that the case study and
the actuarial method of prediction have basic similarities, and secondly, that both
methods would be improved if the difference between them were reduced by routine
testing of the predictions involved in correctional decisions.
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SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES OF CASE STUDY AND ACTUARIAL PREDICTION

One similarity between case study and actuarial prediction is that expectations
of the future behavior of a current case are based on previous experience with cases
which are believed to have resembled the current case in important respects. The
two approaches to prediction involve different methods of appraising this experience,
which will be discussed later.
A second similarity is that predictions by both methods are in terms of risk groups,
rather than absolute predictions. It is true that the practicing correctional official
has to make absolute decisions as to what action will be taken with respect to a
given case. However, few officials with much experience feel absolutely certain
about the predictions involved in arriving at their decisions. They have all made
erroneous predictions, if they have had much experience (that is why we have escapes,
parole violations and unanticipated behavior problems). They expect to make
mistakes again, for no one can have 100 per cent accuracy in predicting complex
human behavior. Even their subjective predictive judgments, we submit, tend to be
in terms of relative risk categories: Case "A" is judged a poor risk for a given program,
or, on the other band, a fair risk or a good risk. He is classified subjectively in a
probability category, as in actuarial prediction, rather than with absolute certainty
that he will succeed or fail on a given program. When predictions are phrased in terms
of absolute certainty, this is usually for rhetorical purposes rather than an experienced
officer's absolute knowledge of how an individual will behave. Sometimes, of course,
the personal capacities required for success on a particular program are so objective
in character as to make the degree of certainty very high in predictions for some cases,
both by case study and by actuarial prediction.
One major difference between case study and actuarial predictions is that the
aspects of the current case which are our basis for prediction are made explicit in
actuarial prediction-they may be only vaguely formulated in case study prediction.
A second difference is that our experience with these aspects, and their relationship
to the behavior being predicted, is systematically tabulated for the purpose of
actuarial prediction, but is only recorded by subjective impression and imperfect
memory, often more from exceptional than from typical cases, as the basis for case
study prediction. One consequence of this imperfect recording of experience is that
it is difficult to pin-point and correct defects of our mental procedure resulting
in inaccuracy of case study prediction unless one endeavors to convert the case study
operations to a somewhat objective set of procedures amenable to actuarial test.
While it is easier to test the separate steps and aspects of an actuarial prediction
procedure, we will argue that case study prediction methods could be tested more than
is generally the case. A first step might be to require that officials record their reasons
for the predictions which they make in connection with important correctional
decisions.
Two features of case study prediction which may make them more accurate than
actuarial predictions should be noted. The first, of course, is that case study predictions are less constrained and less rigid than actuarial predictions in the aspects
of a case which they can take into account, and in the relative weight which they
give to each aspect. More flexibility is possible with case study prediction in dealing
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with relatively unique factors in a case, when one encounters such. Secondly, case
studies may consider the various predictive factors in a case not merely as additive
positive or negative weights, but as a collective configuration-a gestalt, if you prefer
-which has unique features by virtue of the interrelationship of factors.
We would like to point out, first, that these advantages of a case study approach
were taken into account by actuarial prediction studies from the pioneer Burgess
study on. This is indicated by their employment of such subjective overall evaluations of the case as "Psychiatric Prognosis," "Personality Type" and "Social
Type" classifications. Thus, at the same time that case study syntheses of many
aspects of each case were taken into account for actuarial prediction, alternative
disciplines and orientations in the formulation of case study predictions were made
explicit, and were subjected to tests. The possibilities of more.flexible weighting,
and of taking unique configurations of factors into account in actuarial prediction,
have yet to be developed, although important explorations have recently been made
in the application of multiple correlation and configuration analysis to actuarial
prediction. We are not suggesting that actuarial prognosis can ever replace case
study prediction. We are suggesting that the efficiency of. both methods will be
increased if the differences between the two methods are reduced. This will be accomplished if case study prediction orientations are made more explicit and are
tested, and if actuarial prediction methods, are made more flexible and integrative
in the relative weights which they attach to alternative factors -forvarious cases.. .
We would like to add that taking into account complex relationships between
factors in a given case is not something that is handled easily in case study prediction. The clinician, the administrator and others who must make recommendations
or decisions on cases often have difficult struggles in arriving at their predictive
judgments. They do not know the relative predictive significance of the many factors
which seem to oppose one another in their implications as to the future behavior.of
the subject, nor do they know the particular significance of the specific combination
of factors which they encounter-the interrelationship of the factors.
In pondering their decisions, correctional officials often take into account statistical data with which they are familiar-for example, that first offense murderers
generally make good, and that alcoholic forgers generally fail. They also bring to
bear their accumulation of general impressions of past experience, their theories
of personality and their conceptions of social relationships. This is generally a
rather unsystematic integration of what has been acquired through professional
training and through common sense interpretations of our personal experience as
human beings in society.
These mental processes in case study prediction can almost be described as a
subjective search for actuarial data. In pondering our decisions we search for a
classification of past cases with traits similar to those of the case at hand, and for
a tabulation of experience with these past cases. We try to see the interrelationship
of all the traits and processes which we discern in each case before us. In short, the
problem of reducing the many variations and complexities of factors operating in
human behavior to a manageable number is by no means a problem confined to
statisticians engaged in actuarial prediction. Case study research contributes to
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actuarial research by revealing new conceptions by which cases can be classified
statistically. Actuarial research can contribute to case study prediction by testing
the predictive significance of such classifications.
THE

NEED FOR TESTING

oR PREDICTIONS

In Illinois, as in many other states, it has been the custom for several decades
that case study reports for the classification and parole boards terminate with a
specific statement of prognosis. Most of the time these reports have been filed without the authors-psychiatrists and sociologists-checking up on the accuracy of their
prognostications. Some years ago Ohlin showed that only the most favorable of the
several prognostic categories employed in these reports was of consistent significance
in predicting parole violation at the prisons for adult males.' Similar results were
found at another institution.2 A breakdown by specific prognosticators indicated
that, on the whole, sociologists were better case study predictors than psychiatrists.
Data for a limited number of cases suggested that the most accurate predictions were
made by those psychiatrists who were only consultants, and saw only selected referral cases instead of a cross-section of the inmate population.
On the whole, the case study prognoses in Illinois did not provide as valid a basis
for predicting parole outcome as any of several objective factors, such as classifications of criminal record or even "Age at First Leaving Home" (the lower the age,
the higher the prospects of violation). Outstanding as a basis for predicting parole
outcome was a case study evaluation called "Social Type" in some studies and
"Social Development Pattern," when slightly modified, in another study. In these
evaluations, instead of stating their case study prognoses as such, the case study
analysts simply classified the inmate's total behavior before the offense into broad
categories, such as "Respected Citizen," "Ne'er-do-Well," "Drunkard," "Floater"
and "Socially Maladjusted," each of which was roughly defined.
We refer to this Illiniois data not so much to indicate the relative utility of alternative ways of predicting parole outcome, as to suggest the desirability of testing the
predictions involved in correctional decisions. If research were a routine function in
correctional administration, instead of a periodic gesture, the significance of the
prognoses would have been evaluated systematically. The least accurate prognoses
would soon have been apparent, and analyses of erroneous predictions could have
exposed the reasons for error. Conversely, analysis of accurate prediction would
indicate the most valid bases for prediction.
In almost all correctional agencies there is virtually no systematic check upon nor
analysis of the predictions involved in correctional decisions. Corrections is thus like
a business operated without bookkeeping. It is well known in business that unless
the accounts are kept carefully, the operations which we assume are profitable may
actually be contributing to a net loss. If this continues, we are likely suddenly to
find that our liabilities exceed our assets.
The statistical findings in Illinois on such factors as "Age at First Leaving Home"
Ief., LLOYD E. OHLIN, SELECTION FOR PAROLE,
2 DANIEL GLASER, A Reconsideration of Some
Vol. 19, No. 3 (June 1954), pp. 335-341.

Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1951, p. 52.
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and "Social Development Pattern" were interesting not just for their potential
administrative utility, but as strong suggestive evidence of the validity of an adaptation of Sutherland's criminological theory which we have called "Differential Identification." The theoretical considerations may have widespread implications for other
practical correctional decisions-even in the choice of designs for correctional
institutions. Apart from this, in the original decision problem of selection for parole,
the fact that alternative approaches to case study prediction are tested by applying
them to actuarial prediction illustrates how case study and actuarial methods can
contribute to each other. Could not this same cross-fertilization occur if actuarial
prediction research were applied to testing alternative bases of case study prediction
in other correctional decision situations? For example, actuarial checks can be made
on the various bases for decision in institutional classification, in approving postrelease activity programs, and with more sophisticated actuarial research methods, in
answering the crucial question of what is the optimum time for parole.

TnE PossEBIITY OF BETTER TESTs
One type of criticism which is often directed at actuarial studies, such as those
we have cited, is that the studies are based on an incomplete sample. Parole prediction studies, for example, are based only on our experience with those granted
parole in the past, not on those denied parole, but the conclusions are to be applied
to all those considered for parole in the future, including those to whom parole will
be denied. Similarly, probation prediction studies are based only on the success or
failure of those individuals convicted of a crime who were granted probation, not on
those to whom probation was denied, yet the findings of such studies are to be applied
to all who will be eligible for probation consideration.
The above criticism is applicable to case study prediction as well as to actuarial
prediction. Indeed, it applies to all criminology. We only have experience, for any
type of correctional treatment, on those with whom the treatment has been attempted. Fortunately, the inconsistencies of correctional practice, and some deliberate
experimentation, make the omitted cases not as serious a research problem as they
might otherwise be. Insofar as the omitted cases are a problem, they are as much a
problem to case study generalization from experience as to actuarial generalization:
they create a situation where there is no experience, or there is insufficient knowledge
about the experience, to warrant confident conclusions.
The use of the F.B.I. fingerprint records for statistical data on recidivism for all
offenders would contribute tremendously to the solution of the omitted cases problem in testing correctional decisions. The great omitted sample in almost all criminological research consists of those individuals who, after some difficulty with the law,
succeed in avoiding further arrest or conviction. Even the immense value of the
Uniform Crime Reports for advancing our knowledge of American crime would be
overshadowed by the significance of statistics on the courses of different types of
criminal careers under varied conditions. Despite the imperfections still remaining in
the reporting of arrests and convictions to the F.B.I., the number of cases and the
completeness of follow-up possible with F.B.I. records would permit intricate statistical controls not practical in most research with other data. Ideally, the F.B.I. data
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on recidivism should be related to the background information on individual offenders
and their treatment, as recorded in case files of correctional institutions and agencies.
The quality of these case files is highly variable.
Something approaching F.B.I. data in its utility for prediction testing might be
obtained in California or other states where parole, for long periods, is granted to
most prisoners. This permits a more complete follow-up of felon populations than is
possible elsewhere except through F.B.I. fingerprint records. The fact that under
such parole conditions violation rates are about fifty per cent, and that overall
recidivism rates for felons everywhere probably exceed sixty per cent, means that
statistical research with such data can yield much more striking results than is
possible with the more selected and more briefly followed parolees and probationers
who have been the subjects of most criminological prediction study thus far. With
more complete data we would be in a better position to answer not just such questions
as what are the chances of parole being violated in a given type of case, but more
important: When will these chances be a minimum?
In the physical sciences one can distinguish the pure from the applied fields of
study, for example, physics from engineering. These applied sciences take the established generalizations from the pure sciences and apply them, without, as a rule,
thereby contributing to the pure sciences. In the scientific study of the topics of
human behavior which most concern us in practice, we do not have many useful
abstract generalizations as firmly established as those which exist in the physical
sciences. This is the situation partly because it has been difficult to construct prediction tests which can firmly establish the validity of theoretical propositions on
criminal and other types of complex human behavior. In an applied science of human
behavior, such as criminology, choices must be made between alternative abstract
theories. Refinements or complete reformulations must frequently be made in the
theories in order to apply them to situations where it is difficult accurately to appraise
the existence of theoretically conceived predictive factors, or even to measure the
extent of the conformance of outcome to that which was predicted.
If we make a greater effort to test the predictions involved in correctional decisions,
both abstract behavior theory and techniques of correctional practice are likely to
be modified. Progress in the applied field can contribute to progress in making theory
relevant to the empirical world to which the theory refers. Refinement in theory may
in turn contribute to progress towards the objectives of the applied field. This interdependence is such as to render it difficult to separate pure from applied criminological
research. The potential role of prediction research in a science of criminology is
comparable to the role which the prediction of economic trends has in the science of
economics, or even to the role which the prediction of the movement of astronomical
bodies has had in the development of astronomical theory and knowledge. Knowledge is theory which has been tested and found valid. The testing of correctional
decisions can provide one of" the firmest scientific foundations for correctional
knowledge.

